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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The enclosed brief report provides a limited review of proposed
Amendment# 4 for managing and regulating the U.S. sea scallop
fishery. The Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS)
presents a well prepared and comprehensive review of the
potential impacts of Amendment# 4. Moreover, Amendment# 4 is
consistent with the recommendations of the Sea Scallop Plan
Development Team. There remain, however, unresolved issues that
need further attention. The enclosed review is submitted for the
purpose of identifying possible limitations of the SEIS.
The major limitation of proposed Amendment# 4 is the appeals
process or vessel classification scheme. Rather than an appeals
process and prior to implementation of Amendment 4, there should
be a review process in which vessel owners may offer information
in support of the classification they believe they should be
(e.g., full-time, part-time, or occasional).
The SEIS does not offer a true benefit-cost analysis (BCA) in
which producer's and consumer's surplus (or compensating
variation) are estimated and evaluated. It would be more
appropriate to title the benefit-cost analysis section "Economic
Impacts". Moreover, it would be constructive to conduct a risk
assessment of the estimated impacts.
The SEIS does not indicate the potential inequities that might
arise from a fixed days-at-sea restriction. Vessels requiring
less steam time to the fishing grounds will have a competitive
advantage over those vessels requiring longer steam times. This
issue should be addressed in the SEIS.
The evaluation of the potential impacts of requiring 3.25-inch
rings may be erroneous. There is no information available on the
performance of 3.25-inch rings. They may harvest the same as
3.0-inch rings or somewhere between 3.0 and 3.5-inch rings. The
SEIS should clearly state the assumptions used to evaluate the
3.25-inch rings and the need for future research.
The relationship between fishing mortality and days at sea is
assumed. That is, it is assumed that fishing mortality is
linearly related to fishing effort and a constant percentage
reduction in fishing effort will yield the same percentage
reduction in fishing mortality.
It would be preferable that the
relationship be estimated and tested.
The SEIS does present a comprehensive analysis of Amendment #4
and a set of regulations vastly preferable to the meat count
regulation. Provided a review process is established to
determine a vessel's classification prior to the implementation
of Amendment 4 should, Amendment 4 with minor modifications
should be implemented.
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REVIEW - DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT OF AMENDMENT 4 TO THE ATLANTIC SEA SCALLOP
FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN {FMP)

OVERVIEW AMENDMENT 4

Amendment 4 proposes to regulate the fishery primarily via effort
restrictions. The amendment proposes a moratorium on the number of
vessels and restrictions on days at sea per vessel, crew size,
dredge width and ring size, trawl width and mesh size, landing
periods, and the use of technology for the purpose of shucking at
sea (SEIS, pp. 3-4, 12-28).
Additional restrictions include the
use of monitoring devices such as a transponder.
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

Days at sea allocation and vessel categories
issue of major concern to industry and to maximizing net
benefits from the fishery is the proposed effort allocation scheme.
Three categories have been suggested as the preferred alternative:
(1) full time vessels in which average days at sea per year were
greater than or equal to 150 between 1985 and 1990; (2) part-time
fleet in which scallop vessels averaged more than 37 but less than
150 days per year between 1985 and 1990; (3) occasional fleet in
which vessels average 37 days at sea or less.
It is, by now,
relatively well known that the Northeast Fisheries Science Center
weight-out data base is extremely limited.
In previous Plan
Development Team meetings, I indicated to team members that I was
finding approximately 95% error in days at sea per trip for vessels
for which I maintain detailed data.
I also recently learned that
the Margaret Rose, a vessel on which I conducted research in 1991,
was not even on the 1/11/93 list. The 1/11/93 list also shows the
Kathy Rose and Sea Wife to be part time vessels. All three vessels
are from New Jersey and are full time vessels.
An
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Amendment 4 proposes to address these problems via an appeals
process. While an appeals process is appropriate, it must be done
prior to implementation of Amendment 4.
A final classification
should be done by NMFS and each permit holder should be sent a
letter indicating the vessel classification. A ninety day period
should be established in which vessel owners can protest their
classification and offer proof indicating how they believe they
should be classified. It would be preferable if an industry panel
comprised of individuals from local ports were established to
review submissions of claims for different classifications.
The classification scheme also poses other potential problems. The
three classifications are suggested as necessary to address issues
of equality. The SEIS never indicates how equality is measured nor
does it provide any analysis indicating costs and benefits
associated with different classifications.
Previous analysis
"Kirkley and DuPaul, 1988, Effort restrictions in the sea scallop
dredge fishery, VIMS Marine Resource Report No. 88-1" demonstrated
that uniform regulations such as a proportionate reduction in
effort for all vessels have substantially different impacts on
vessels from different geographic areas and on vessels of different
sizes and configuration. A similar conclusion was obtained for a
constant reduction in days at sea (e.g., all vessels are restricted
to 200 days per year).
In addition, the sea scallop plan
development team recommended that eleven groupings be established.
A critical element missing from the classification scheme is the
analysis of the impacts on different vessels (SEIS, pp. 105-110).
For example, how many vessels will and will not likely be affected
in 1993 by the proposed effort level (SEIS indicates 55% for three
group scheme and less than 50% for the 22 group scheme; it does not,
however, offer an economic assessment). What will be the changes
in harvests, revenues, costs, and net benefits of vessels of
different sizes and homeports.
In the absence of such analysis,
the potential for differential impacts can be only subjectively
evaluated (e.g., a restriction of 200 days per year per vessel will
more severely affect Virginia and North Carolina vessels because
these vessels generally require more steam time to reach the
fishing grounds). Previous analysis done by the Council staff has
demonstrated that Virginia vessels have a higher ratio of days at
sea to days fishing than do New England vessels. The SEIS does not
address the potential geographic inequities which may be associated
with uniform regulations.
Moratorium and classification

The entire SETS discussion on the moratorium is confusing. There
are two appararent cut-off or control dates.
Page 8 indicates a
control date of December 1989 or existing vessels and March 2, 1989
VIMS: J. KIRKLEY
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for new or rerigged vessels.
Page 2 indicates a control data of
March 2, 1989 for existing vessels and December 31, 1990 for newly
constructed or rerigged vessels. Page 13 also indicates a March 2
cut-off date for the moratorium. The control dates and what they
mean must be clearly documented in the SEIS.
Because of the
statement on the top of page 4, industry now believes that the
control date is the end of December 1989.
Unfortunately, the control date is not the only problem with the
moratorium.
The NMFS data collection program is voluntary and
provides better coverage of New Bedford--the major New England
port. Vessels that are either misclassified or not classified in
the list of vessels that qualify must engage is an expensive
appeals process to prove they qualify to be in the fishery and to
change their status.
Thus, the moratorium process may be
discriminatory in that it is likely that fewer New Bedford vessels
will appeal while more vessels in other states will appeal a
discriminatory practice based on voluntary data.
The National
Marine Fisheries Service and the New England Council could
potentially be sued to cover the costs of vessel owners that
successfully appeal their classification or on the basis of
discriminatiory and inequitable practices.
Alternatively, all
vessel owners could be forced to submit proof of their historical
participation in the fishery.
There also could be problems with the manner in which vessel are
classified. New vessels with a one year or less history could be
classfied as a full time scallop vessels while existing vessels
could be classified as occasional or part-time vessel. If a vessel
was purchased in 1985 and under repairs for most of 1985 and 1986,
fished full time in 1987, and then was repaired alot during 1988
and 1989, the vessel would be classified as a part time vessel.
Alternatively, consider a vessel that was part time in 1985-1987
but switched to full time in 1989 or 1989; throwing out the lowest
and highest years of scallop activity could result in the vessel
being classified as part time.
Alternative to the current classification scheme might be to
examine the 1988 and 1989 activities of vessels and determine their
status.
Then send a letter to those owners whose vessels were
classified as part time or occasional to determine the reasons. If
the reasons were mechanical, then the owners should be allowed to
declare their intent and classified accordingly.
Harvest levels, fishirJ.9.JJJortality, and impacts of .3.25-inch rings

The environmental impact statement offers an analysis of the
impacts of requiring 3.25-inch rings during the first two years of
Amendment 4. Unfortunately, there have been no experiments in
VIMS: ,J. KIRKLEY
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which the 3.25-inch rings were used. Thus, there is no basis on
which to assess how 3.25 inch ri.ngs will perform.
It is reasonable to assume that the 3.25 inch rings will perform at
a level between 3 and 3.5-inch rings, but that level is unknown.
There is absolutely no information on the relationship between
harvests and tow times for 3.25-inch rings.
This could be
important if longer tow times cause the 3.25 inch ring to harvest
the same quantity and sizes of scallops as harvested by 3.0 inch
rings.
Previous experiments by DuPaul et al. (1989) "Comparative
analysis of sea scallop escapement/retention and resulting economic
impacts" indicated that longer tow times by 3.5-inch rings
increased total catch per tow but not catch per unit of effort. In
fact, the optimum tow time with respect to maximizing catch appears
to be considerably less than the 35-50 minute tows typical of MidAtlantic dredge vessels. Additional at sea experiments by DuPaul
and Kirkley in 1991 and 1992 indicated that vessel captains often
set tow times in accordance with their desire to keep product on
deck at all times and the crew reasonably busy but not excessively
busy. It is possible, although unknown, that 5 to 10 minute longer
tows with 3.25 inch rings would yield the same harvest rate as 3.0
inch rings and slightly shorter tows.
Tow times, however, also vary with resource conditions and catch
levels.
A more important issue ignored in the SEIS is the
relationship between cull size and ring size.
The SEIS does not
address the relationship between ring size, cull size, and the
elimination of the meat count regulation.
Three_ and one-half inch rings and associated impacts

Page 207 of the SEIS states "Prior examination of the benefits of
increasing ring size concluded that regulations (increasing ring
size) could easily be circumvented by modifications to other
portions of the dredge.
This statement appears to be misleading
and based on experiments in which neither cookies (donuts) nor
chaffing gear were used. In contrast, experiments by DuPaul et al.
"Comparative analysis of sea scallop escapement/retention and
resulting economic impacts" found that the 3. 5-inch rings could not
be easily circumvented by minor modifications to the gear given a
fully-rigged dredge.
The SEIS needs to states explicitly the
nature of other experiments and how the gear was rigged; captains
involved in some of the NMFS experiments indicated that the gear
was fished without any donuts or chaffing gear.

VIMS: J. KIRKLEY
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Short-run qualitative vs. long-run quantitative assessment of impacts

Section F "Economic effects of the proposed action" (page 105,
SEIS) indicates that the economic analysis of Amendment 4 includes
a qualitative evaluation of the short-term impacts and a
quantitative analysis of the long-term impacts.
As the primary
author of the 'qualitative' short-run impacts, I find this
characterization by the Council staff to be puzzling. Pages 241
through 268 of the SEIS provide a rather rigorous quantitative
analysis.
Admittedly, the analyses contained on pages 241-268 are limited
because data were only for Mid-Atlantic vessels.
However, the
analyses may not be as short-run as suggested in the SEIS.
It is
well known that extensive cross-section data provide a better
indication of long-run adjustment and equilibrium conditions than
obtainable from annual and more aggregate data.
Moreover, the
assessment of crew share done by the council was based only on a
New England lay-system using annual data.
In addition, the data
set used to assess costs was quite limited in terms of number of
observations.
The SEIB should provide more detailed information
about the data used to assess the 1 long-run 1 impacts (e.g.,
geographic areas and source of data rather than provider of data).
Benefit-cost analysis

The SEIS provides a benefit-cost analysis or assessment of net
benefits possible from implementing the preferred alternative. The
measure of net benefits and the assessment, however, pose several
problems.
Net benefits are measured by the difference between
revenues and producer costs (i.e., profit or net rent).
Net
benefits, however, should be in terms of consumer's plus producer's
surplus, and quite possibly economic rent to labor. Therefore, the
SEIB does not provide an analysis of net benefits.
More important, the inshore/offshore allocation in the Gulf of
Alaska and Bering Sea clearly raised the possibility that labor
earns economic rent.
If labor in the scallop fishery earn rents,
then rent to labor should be included in the measure of net
benefits. As often is the case, the Council staff likely do not
have information on opportunity costs and labor earnings. An ongoing study by DuPaul and Kirkley, however, has collected extensive
information on crew earnings, opportunity costs, and hazardous-duty
premiums. Although all the data have not been compiled, there is
evidence to suggest that vessel captains and crew do earn
considerable rent from scalloping. The issue of economic rent to
labor, therefore, needs to be considered in evaluating net benefits
from Amendment 4.

VIMS : ;J. KIRKLEY
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The assessment of net benefits also does not appear to have been
subjected to a risk assessment. A risk assessment could be quite
beneficial for evaluating the net benefits particularly given that
net benefits are not realized for several years and appear to be
relatively low.
A risk assessment might indicate that the
probability of net benefits being non-positive was non-zero.
In addition, evaluation of net benefits might be more convincing if
imports were more thoroughly considered.
The assessment of exvessel price (page 117, SEIS) assumes that the price of imported
scallops will remain constant between 1993 and 2007.
This is
likely to be an unrealistic assumption particularly given the
expanded production capabilities of the Chinese.
Interestingly,
DuPaul et al.
(1989)
"Comparative analysis of sea scallop
escapement/retention and resulting economic impacts'' (pp. 107-109)
indicated that ex-vessel prices declined as imports from Canada and
other nations increased. The economic assessment contained in the
SEIS should provide a detailed analysis of the potential changes in
import demand and supply. The is also important since restrictions
on days at sea will likely force vessels to curtail activities
during late fall and early winter which is when harvests decline
and imports from China appear to increase.
The allocation,
therefore, offers an opportunity for the Chinese to increase market
penetration and market share.
The benefit cost analysis assumes that fishing mortality is
proportional to fishing effort (days at sea) and the catch-effort
equation and cost function are characterized by constant returns to
scale (i.e., a ten-percent reduction in effort reduces output by 10
percent and a 10% reduction in effort reduces cost by 10 percent).
The SEIS offers no empirical analysis to validate these
assumptions.
This is important because the effort reduction
schedule maintains the proportionality assumption when, in fact,
data contrary to the proportionality assumption were presented to
the Plan Development Team. It is relatively easy to estimate the
relationship between fishing mortality (F) and fishing effort (f)
and test the proportionality assumption.
Similarly, previous
analysis, analysis contained in appendix VI, and analysis in the
draft Kirkley (1993) "Technical efficiency in the mid-Atlantic sea
scallop fishery" all reject the proportionality assumption or a
global constant relationship between catch and effort. Simply put,
there is no evidence to support the assumptions that fishing
mortality is linearly proportional to fishing effort, that catch is
directly proportional to effort, or that the average cost per unit
of effort is constant over all levels of effort, other inputs, and
resource conditions.
Available evidence, in fact, suggests the
opposite.

VIMS: J. KIRKLEY
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As specified, the SEIS assumes the following:
F (fishing mortality)= q (catchability) * f (fishing effort)

(1)

c (catch) = q * f * N (resource conditions)

(2)

cs (costs) = w (cost per unit of effort) * f

(3)

The fishing mortality relationship needs to be empirically derived
and not assumed. This is similarly true for the catch equation
( 2) . The cost equation is a misspecification of total costs; there
are other variable costs related to output such as crew share and
captain's share.
Interestingly, if equation (2) is a correct
characterization of the technology, it is impossible to define the
point of maximum profit (revenue less producer costs); the catch
equation exhibits constant returns to scale which prevents the
optimum profit point and supply function from being determined.
The benefit cost analysis should estimate the catch and cost
equations for the three and twenty-two groups and estimate the
fishing mortality equation, at least, using standardized effort.
Then, costs and benefits should be calculated and compared for all
the regulatory options. This would permit an assessment of total
benefits and the distributional aspects of the regulations and
groupings.
The benefit-cost analysis also does not provide an assessment of
changes in technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, scale
efficiency, or social efficiency.
That is, will the preferred
alternative improve technical efficiency, and hence, social
efficiency.
Recent analysis in Kirkley
( 1993)
"Technical
efficiency in the mid-Atlantic sea scallop fishery" suggests that
restricting days at sea and crew size will improve technical
efficiency over the year because vessels will avoid excess labor
and fishing during periods when resource conditions are very
depressed; the analysis also indicates, however, that gross
earnings and returns to crew, captain, and vessel owner will
decline in the short-run.
Adverse impact on public health or safety

The draft SEIS, Section C (p. 94) titled "Will the proposed action
be reasonably expected to have a substantial adverse impact on
public health or safety''· The title and contents in this section
appear to be mismatched. This section presents information on the
impacts on employment and community structure, small towns, and a
discussion of historical practices and cultural aspects. I find no
VIMS: J. KIRKLEY
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evidence of a discussion on public health or safety.
There also, however, is a problem with the analysis presented in
this section.
Social impacts are evaluated based on an inputoutput model or multipliers for southern New England during 1980.
The fishery/industry is U.S. wide and it is 1993. It is unlikely
that the 1980 multipliers for southern New England are appropriate
for 1990 or 1992 or that the southern New England multipliers are
appropriate for Maine, Virginia, New York, and New Jersey. In the
absence of appropriate multipliers, it would probably be better to
omit the evaluation of the impacts on employment or discuss only
relative to Massachusetts,
Rhode
Island,
and Connecticut.
Additional multipliers are available, however, for Maine, Maryland,
and Virginia and probably many other states.
Alternatively, if the secLion on public health and safety is to
remain, perhaps it would be appropriate to discuss Georges Bank
scallops and PSP problems during 1991.
The discussion on vessel
safety and alternative regulations, although limited, appears to be
appropriate. The section on public health and safety would likely
benefit by including a discussion on economic fraud and the use of
phosphates and current FDA concerns about sea scallops.
Minor concerns

Page 115, footnote 4.
The estimated crew-share equation is
statistically incorrect. The dependent variable is specified as a
function of itself (e.g., f(y) equals g(y)). This leads to severe
simultaneous equation bias.
It would be better to use a formula
for the lay-system.
Moreover, the R-square value is erroneous
since the equation has no intercept term.
The evaluation of costs and net benefits, however defined, needs to
consider alternative lay-systems. The lay-systems are different at
different ports.
Vessels in Virginia have a 60/40 gross-stock
split, a 50/50 partial net-stock split, and several other laysystems.
New ,Jersey vessels also have different splits and
deductions from owner and captain shares. In the last quarter of
1990, some Virginia vessel owners changed their lay system from a
60/40 split to a 50/50 net split to allow crew to have higher
earnings given depressed landings and revenues and increased costs.
Restricting the analysis to the New Bedford lay-system is as
limited and short-run as is restricting the analysis to one laysystem used in the Mid-Atlantic states. Assessment of net benefits
should consider several of the more common lay systems and a mix of
lay systems; this would allow evaluation of the lay-system likely
to be used and indicate whether or not net benefits were
particularly sensitive to the lay-system.
··----·-----·
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Page 117, footnote 8.
The estimated ex-vessel price equation
reports the Durbin-Watson statistic which is incorrect for
evaluating serial correlation in the presence of lagged endogenous
variables. Numerous other statistics are available (e.g., R-square
and F, Ljung-Box, LaGrangean, and Durbin-h; these other tests are
described in introductory econometric texts) .
Moreover, the
Durbin-Watson and Durbin-h tests are for first-order serial
correlation (i.e., noise in current period is related to noise one
period ago).
Since the data used to estimate the price equation
are quarterly, the residuals should be examined for first and
fourth-order autocorrelation and possibly an nth order
autoregressive structure.
Page 7. Increased catch per unit is not necessary equivalent to a
benefit. If CPUE increased, cost per unit of production increased,
and price per pound decreased, "Would this generate a benefit?"
Page 115, Section a, Cost composition.
The section defines
variable costs as those expenses that are proportional to fishing
effort such as fuel, oil, water, ice, repairs, wages, and salaries.
Why are costs that vary with the level of production, such as crew
shares, not variable costs. The wording in this section suggests
that the production technology is either separable in inputs or is
a non-separable two stage technology as in Pollak in Wales (1987)
"A non-separable two stage technology", Journal of Political
Economy. Possibly more important, the discussion in this section
attributes all variable costs to effort and none to the production
of scallops.
I guess we assume the variable costs of producing
scallops is zero.
The section on costs would be improved if the narrative followed
the reasoning that effort was a produced intermediate input and the
technology was either separable in inputs or comprised of a
nonseparable multistage technology.
In this case, it could be
argued that fishermen minimize the cost of producing fishing effort
and then maximize revenues, profits, or utility subject to fishing
effort and other constraints in the second stage.
There are also some potential problems with the items selected as
variable inputs. Many items are quasi-fixed at the trip level and
vary with number of trips and not days at sea per trip or per year
(e.g., ice, water, and some repairs).
In addition, longer trips
does not equate to higher crew wages and salaries; in fact, there
is some evidence indicating that vessels make longer trips when
crew and owner shares are declining. This section and footnote 4
are also very misleading since they are based on the New Bedford
lay-system.
In Virginia and New Jersey, there are vessels which
deduct the captain's bonus from the crew share of the gross stock
to determine the net to crew (e.g., crew share= .6 gross stock . 05 gross stock
crew expenses
(fuel,
food,
insurance,
electronics, and other).
VIMS: J. KIRKLEY & W. DUPAUL
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There is some confusion on page 118 "The cost benefit analysis
presented thus far does not include any savings in labor expenses,
since in the absence of alternative employment possibilities, the
opportunity cost of labor does not change".
If there are no
alternative employment opportunities, the opportunity cost for
labor is zero or very low. If this is the case, then all earnings
to labor are economic rent.
If true, the cost-benefit analysis
must consider economic rent to labor as a benefit.
Table 10, page 148. Title suggests that preferred alternative is
for 3 inch rings in years one and two.
Table 6, page 144.
Information in table does not appear to be
consistent with likely outcomes.
Given a full-time fleet of 160
vessels, a 10000 pound trip limit, and the assumption that
approximately 12 days are required to obtain 10,000 pounds per
trip, a vessel would be able to take 26 trips per year with a two
day layover. This arrangement would allow a single vessel to have
more than 300 days per year and the full time fleet days at sea
would exceed 50,000 days per year. Table 7, page 145 has the same
problem.
Page 95, Communities.
The SEIS indicates that New Bedford, Cape
May, and Hampton-Norfolk have other opportunities for temporary and
long-term employment. That is correct if you consider minimum wage
opportunities. I do not understand, however, the statement in the
same paragraph "Scallopers from these ports have more flexibility
to pursue other fisheries and fish other scallop grounds." I would
like to know who do these scallopers have more flexibility than.
If scallopers from these ports are supposed to have more
flexibility than seal.lepers from small ports, then this should be
stated.
However, this may not be true if one allows for labor
mobility.
I also think the SEIS should state the source
identifying other available opportunities and the nature of these
alternative opportunities.
The SEIS should define a community (e.g., the greater metropolitan
community
or the hispanic community or the Adams-Morgan
community).
This definition is important since small towns are
probably viewed as one community and then evaluated relative to a
large city with several communities (e.g., the effort reduction
schedule will devastate the hispanic community of Hampton-NorfolkNewport News by 1995 while the impact will likely be minimal on the
large geographically defined community).
Moreover, many of the
large cities or areas have numerous small towns or communities.
What is the basis for the statement on page 102 "If individually
owned, as opposed to corporation boats, leave the scallop fishery,
ethnic minorities and other marginal participants will be impacted
the most. Hispanics, Vietnamese, and Portuguese scallopers will be
among those minorities." I have considerable trouble with this
VIMS: J. KIRKLEY & W.
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section. First, I do not believe that Portuguese scallopers are a
minority, particularly in New Bedford. Second, Hispanics would be
very affected if Virginia corporate vessels left the fishery. The
corporate vessels employ a large number of hispanics.
More
important, however, I would like to know the source of the data
upon which the various statements in this section were based. Who
did a survey of hispanics and Vietnamese in the fishery to
determine the number of Hispanics and Vietnamese in the fishery.
I also have problems with the statement about corporation boats.
It makes sense for any one vessel to be organized under the rules
of incorporation.
There could be an arrangement whereby an
individual owning many vessels incorporates each vessel.
Page 102. Why is product quality immediately improved if vessels
switch from shell stocking to shucking at sea.
What if vessels
that shell stock take very short trips of 4-7 days and hand-shuck
the scallops at the dock.
What is the quality differential
relative to a vessel that takes 15 days trips and shucks at sea.
Page 97. Historical practices and cultural aspects.
The opening
statement for this section states that the history of the fishery
has been poorly documented. This is incorrect; the history of the
fishery is very well documented in the U.S. and Canadian Maritime
Boundary summary documents.
Page 65. Why would demand fluctuate with supply? This statement
makes no sense. Demand remains constant with no shifts but supp1y
is allowed to shift; a new equilibrium price is obtained and the
quantity demanded changes. Demand and supply need to be discussed
in more detail.
Page 64.
Scallop meats are packed in bags that hold about 40
pounds until they reach a dealer or processor. There are various
size bags and many vessels use 45-50 pound bags.
Scallops are
frequently soaked in iced sea water to chill the product; the use
of ice and sea water minimizes the uptake and weight gain and helps
the meats to avoid waffering, particularly during hot summer
periods. Soaking in ice and sea water is done to maintain product
quality and not to increase product weight.
I recommend that the entire paragraph on product quality and iced
sea water and fresh water (page 64) be rewritten. Is weight gain
from soaking really an added benefit or is it a cost to society and
eventually to industry. Remember the increasing amount of liquor
(water and oyster drip) added to shucked oyster meats; it nearly
killed the industry. I also have no idea how Council staff would
know that 'many' fishermen soak their seal.lops in fresh water. It
is very likely to have occurred, but I do not know of any existing
data source that indicates how widespread the practice is among
industry.
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The processing sector discussion (page 63) also needs to be
rewritten.
Not all vessels in the fishery work six-hour shifts.
Many vessels from Virginia and New Jersey work twelve-hour shifts
(personal observation and informal interviews with members of
industry). Also, what is an independent vessel operator? I assume
this is an owner/operated vessel that is not incorporated.
The
SEIS should indicate the source of information used to determine
'independent vessel operators' and number of vertically integrated
firms and firms with retail sales.
Page 63, section 2 a, At-sea processing.
"What are undersized
scallops?" There is no such thing as an undersized scallop for an
operation that shucks scallops at sea. The crew, however, may deem
some scallops to be too small to shuck and these are discarded.
Page 65, section 3, Marketing sector. The statement about price,
which seems to be elastic (last paragraph, p. 65) makes no sense.
I think Council staff are attempting to state that consumer demand
is highly elastic; something also needs to be stated about the
income elasticity. I also seriously doubt that imports from Canada
fill a void in the market for low-cost, frozen alternatives to the
higher priced and larger domestic scallop. Canadians export fresh
sea scallop meats which are very likely to be perfect substitutes
for domestic production. In addition, previously frozen imported
scallops are sold in the thawed form at many retail outlets.
Last paragraph on page 65 "Demand for sea scallops appears to
fluctuate with supply which is limited by resource conditions. 11
Economic conditions also limit supply and this needs to be stated
in the SEIS.
Some vessels tie-up between November and January
because product and input prices are inadequate in conjunction with
resource conditions.
Page 1. What is the basis for concluding that much of the resource
is not self-sustaining.
Page 1.
Why do highly mobile fleets, integrated markets, and a
lack of reproductive isolation argue strongly for uniformity in the
management program.
If anything, these conditions would argue
against uniformity if the objective of management is to maximize
net benefits.
Page 7.
Effort reduction will benefit the fishery by rewarding
current participants with increases in catch per unit effort. This
is hypothetical and not based on empirical evidence.
Capital
stuffing, alone, could dissipate any gains. I doubt the moratorium
is going to substantially reduce the overall size of the fleet. If
catch per unit effort does increase, it will do so over short
intervals of time which will more severely depress ex-vessel
prices; bottom line is that increased catch per unit effort may
equate to decreased net return per unit effort.
VIMS : J. KIRKLEY & W. DUPAUL
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Page 7. Effort reduction will have beneficial. impacts on by-catch
and associated species.
This may, in general, be true, but it
needs to be empirically illustrated. In addition, what happens if
a full-time scalloper is also classified as a part-time groundfish
fisherman; what happens to harvests of other species.
More
important, are their temporal patterns associated with by-catch
that would increase actual harvests of other species (e.g., would
more or fewer winter and little skates be caught under the
allocation scheme). The relationship between effort reduction an
by-catch must be empirically determined.
Page 7. If the ring size restriction and the supplemental measures
are effective in reducing the catches of young scallops, they will
diminish the need for large effort reductions. Does this statement
imply a possible trade-off between the level of days at sea
restrictions and ring-size.
If so, this contradicts the PDT
recommendation (March 2-3 meeting, see page 197 SEIS) that ring
size controls not be considered at this time to offset days-at-sea
restrictions.
Page 10.
Is it economically rational to limit upgrades in a
vessel's fishing power.
This limit automatically implies that
management is not concerned with maximizing net benefits.
Replacing older engines with new engines having increased
horsepower could improve fuel consumption;
thus,
technical
efficiency and allocative and social efficiency could be improved.
What about remote rudder control and changes in the configuration
of gear-matics and winch controls (e.g., changes that improve
captain's ability to operate dredges from bridge) .
Limits on
upgrades are also limits on productivity; how can this be
justified.
Page 25. If the weighout system is voluntary, how is it determined
that approximately 80-90% of sea scallop landings are reported
through the system.
How were these estimates made and upon what
data were they based. How was it determined that all vessel trips
out of New Bedford and Hampton VA were recorded by NMFS; I know of
no formal survey ( excluding the interview survey) that is conducted
by NMFS to determine fishing activity for all vessels.
Page 27.
Crew size is intended to cap fishing power of vessels.
If this is true, is it necessary to also cap fishing power or
engine horsepower (e.g., if it is known that shucking capacity is
1500 pounds per day and vessels are allocated 200 days per year,
then the maximum total harvest for a fleet of 160 vessels is 48
million pounds per year). Vessels could, of course, harvest more
with additional fishing power and then shell stock the surplus.
Nevertheless, the notion of limiting economic efficiency and
productivity needs to be further considered.
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Page 27.
Who conducted the survey to determine that over 40
scallop boats in the region have already installed the proposed
monitoring system?
Alternatively, what is the source of this
statement?
Page 33.
Income redistribution.
Tieing up a vessel can reduce
fixed or quasi-fixed costs (e.g., change in insurance premiums) as
well as variable costs.
Page 33.
What are supply costs for fuel, ice, and food?
This
makes no sense. I assume that statement implies that expenditures
on fuel, food, and ice or cost of supplies will decrease. This
conclusion, however, may not be correct. Both the groundfish and
scallop amendments call for reductions in days at sea; we can
expect total demand for fuel to change and possibly total supply to
shift.
It is possible that total expenditures on fuel may not
change. It is likely that there will be a redistribution of income
in the industry independent of redirecting fishing effort.
Page 6.
The report assumes that the current stock level is at
historically high levels. This is inaccurate as many vessels both
in New England and the Mid-Atlantic have reduced fishing effort or
modified fishing strategies in response to substantially reduced
catch rates.
Page 7.
The statement that habitat impact by the proposed gear
restrictions (larger rings) is absent.
This is not completely
accurate; previous gear studies (DuPaul et al.) measured a
significant decrease in the quantity of "trash" caught with the use
of 3.5-inch rings.
It is also reasonable to assume that if the
quantity of trash (e.g., shells, sand, various invertebrates, and
fish) is reduced with larger rings, the impact on the biological
communities may be reduced.
Page 10.
The report assumes that with proper enforcement and
compliance, a meat count standard would limit the catch of "small"
scallops. This is not completely accurate because we do not really
know the impact or extent of industry practices such as mixing and
soaking to lower the average meat count. Anecdotal evidence leads
us to believe that such practices can allow industry to harvest a
significant quantity of small scallops with a meat count standard
in the 33-36 MPP range. We would not expect a real decrease in the
harvest of small scallops until the meat count standard was lowered
to approximately 30 MPP.
Page 13.
The report refers to the term "trip" to set the
destinations between limited access permits and a general category
scallop permit (i.e., 400 pounds per 24 hour trip).
What is the
definition of a "trip" as used in the context of the SEIS? With a
bit of imagination and lacking a clear definition of a trip, one
could conjure numerous strategies to circumvent the intended
distinction between groups.

-------------
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Page 13.
If a vessel declared an intent to fish for scallops by
completing a permit application and does not fish for scallops--in
either federal or state waters--will that permit be lost or will it
be held by the Regional Director for the applicant's future use?
The distinction is not clear in Section V.B on permits.
Page 19. The restriction of a 5. 5-inch minimum mesh throughout the
net with no chafing gear on the top may be excessive in view of the
3.5-inch minimum shell height for shellstocking and for net boats
shucking scallops at sea.
Studies on the selectivity of scallop
nets (DuPaul et al.) used a maximum of 5-inch mesh with chafing
gear on both the top and bottom of a two-seam net and on the top
and bottom of the cod end. Additional research on the selectivity
of scallop trawls is warranted and desirable in view of the
possible implications of the proposed gear restrictions in
combination with the abolition of the meat count standard.
Page 23. The report states that permits for the various entities
in the scallop fishery are needed.
However, the report details
permit sanctions for violations only for permitted vessel
operators. No sanctions are detailed for vessel permit violations
nor for dealer permit violations. On the surface, this may sound
quite unfair to the vessel captains if sanctions are not detailed
for other permit holders.
Page 23.
The report states that approximately 421 vessels are
subject to the moratorium and thus the number of vessel operator
permits would equal or slightly exceed that number. This may be a
gross underestimation as it is common practice for mates to take
charge of the vessel while the captain takes a trip off.
Consequently, it is conceivable that every mate and aspiring
captain would apply for a vessel operator's permit and double the
number of expected applications.
Page 26. The report states that a significant number of eight year
old scallops will exist after Fis reduced to 0.97. We do not know
where this statement is referenced nor whether it is a realistic
expectation. Eight-year old scallops are quite large with very low
meat counts.
Page 36. The stated tow times for scallop trawls of 30-45 minutes
is not very accurate and is significantly greater and likely to be
quite variable by geographic region. The two times recorded during
the research on mesh size selectivity ranged for 60 to 220 minutes.
Tow-times are highly variable depending on vessel, number of nets
towed, size of net, time of day, and scallop abundance and density.
Statements in the SEIS relative to trawl size and tow times are
oversimplifications and are not accurate.
Page 3 6.
The text on the potential interact ions between sea
scallop fishing and sea turtles is out of date. A more recent
·------·--··----------
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review of the interactions is available in the Decline of Sea
Turtles, National Academy of Science, 1990.
Page 41. The report states that a 1500 pound trip limit would be
required for the part-time fleet ...
I am not sure, but I think
there is some confusion between the concept of a part-time vessel
and what some would imagine as a part-time trip. Although a vessel
would be identified as a part time vessel fishing less days, it
would still have to operate making fewer full length trips with
catch rates exceeding 1500 pounds per trip. Part time refers to an
element of time and not an element of harvest.
Page 55.
There is no discussion
associations with sea scallops.

of

epifaunal

Page 56. Liparis ~ is a fish and not sea snail.
seasnail (one word).

and

epifloral

Common name is

Page 58. Scallop dredges are as wide as 17 feet and are usually
used on smooth bottoms; not all vessels have the capability of
using 17 foot dredges. Most vessels use 15 foot or smaller dredges
which can be used on smooth and hard bottoms.
When vessels fish
the very hard bottoms in the Great South Channel, some captains
prefer to use 13 foot dredges.
Page 64.

The entire section on processing needs to be rewritten.

Page 65. The report states that there are a variety of reasons as
to why vessels shift from shell-stocking to shucking at sea and
vice-versa; all are not completely accurate. Shell heights are not
necessary easier to measure than meat counts.
Many vessels stop
shellstocking when there are significant numbers of scallops
smaller than 3.5 inches.
Sorting large numbers of scallops to
comply with the shell height restriction is tedious and difficult.
There is no evidence to support the assumption that vessels shift
to shucking at sea in order to improve quality and price; both are
relative terms.
A better price for the catch is relative to the
cost of the fishing operation and what the crew realizes as a
share.
Three men on a shellstocking vessel may make more than a
crew of ten on a shucking vessel.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Prior to implementation of Amendment 4 and possibly prior to public
hearings, numerous issues need to be resolved. First, there is a
need to establish a formal appeals process to determine number of
full and part time vessels and number of vessels to be allowed in
the fishery.
If these numbers are different than those in the
SEIS, the impacts will need to be reestimated.
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On a practical note, it would be preferable that the process be
called a review and correction process.
An appeals process may
require Amendment# 4 to be first implemented.
A through review of the control dates and moratorium and vessel
classification scheme should be undertaken prior to implementation
of Amendment 4.
A second major problem is the need to more fully assess the
ramifications of 3. 25-inch rings.
If these larger rings end up
having nearly identical selectivity to 3.0 inch rings, the impacts
of using 3.25-inch rings may equal the impacts of using 3.0-inch
rings.
A third major problem is the price model. The price model is based
on quarterly data.
As days at sea become limiting, vessels will
likely reallocate or change their temporal fishing strategy.
In
addition, dealers will likely alter their derived demand for raw
materials.
First and fourth quarter demand patterns could very
well be quite different under Amendment 4 than the historical
patterns. Moreover, the industry has undergone considerable change
in the past ten years; thus, the estimated demand equation could be
very unstable.
These possibilities need to be considered in the
evaluation of the changes in revenues.
A fourth major problem is the assumed relationship between fishing
mortality and fishing effort.
This relationship needs to be
empirically verified to determine the effort reduction schedule.
A fifth problem is the potential for inequitable impacts by
geographical area, vessel size, and gear type.
This needs to be
considered in evaluating the impacts of Amendment 4.
A sixth problem is the assumption that catch per unit effort will
increase and total cost will decrease; thus, net benefits will
increase. It would be informative to provide an assessment of how
much catch per unit effort will increase and total costs of
production will decline relative to no action and alternative
strategies.
A seventh major problem is the assumption that import prices will
remain constant. The proposed amendment offers an opportunity for
foreign nations to increase their market share; this needs to be
evaluated prior to implementation of Amendment 4.
An eighth major problem is the evaluation of community impacts. It
simply makes no sense to compare small communities to large
communities on an equal basis.
In Newport News, VA, there are
hispanic and Vietnamese communities. At least, offer a discussion
about the definition of a community.
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A ninth problem is the use of the southern New England 1980 inputoutput model and multipliers.
The multipliers are likely out of
date and inappropriate for other areas and states.
A tenth problem is that the benefit cost analysis is not an
analysis of benefits and costs.
Alternatively, the analysis
assumes that consumers' benefits are zero. Consumer benefits need
to be considered in the benefit cost analysis.
Moreover, a risk
assessment of the benefits and costs needs to be conducted. Last,
the benefit cost analysis needs to considered economic rent to
labor, particularly given that the SEIS suggests that the
opportunity cost of labor is zero.
Last, the SEIS needs to incorporate on-going efforts by the FDA
relative to proposed regulations (Amendment 4) •
There may be
ramifications of FDA policy that affect the implementation or
impacts of Amendment 4.
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